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Abstract 27 
Human interaction with animals has been implicated as a primary risk factor for several high 28 
impact zoonoses, including many bat-origin viral diseases; however, the animal-to-human 29 
spillover events that lead to emerging diseases are rarely observed or clinically examined, and 30 
the link between specific interactions and spillover risk is poorly understood. To investigate this 31 
phenomenon, we conducted biological-behavioral surveillance among rural residents in the 32 
Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong provinces of Southern China, where we have identified a 33 
number of SARS-related coronaviruses in bats.  Serum samples were tested for four bat-borne 34 
coronaviruses using newly developed enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISA). Survey 35 
data were used to characterize associations between human-animal contact and bat 36 
coronavirus spillover risk. A total of 1,596 residents were enrolled in the study from 2015 to 37 
2017. Nine participants (0.6%) tested positive for bat coronaviruses. 265 (17%) participants 38 
reported severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) and/or influenza-like illness (ILI) symptoms in 39 
the past year, which were associated with poultry, carnivore, rodent/shrew, and bat contact, with 40 
variability by family income and province of residence. This study provides serological evidence 41 
of bat coronavirus spillover in rural communities in Southern China. The low seroprevalence 42 
observed in this study suggests that bat coronavirus spillover is a rare event. Nonetheless, this 43 
study highlights associations between human-animal interaction and zoonotic spillover risk. 44 
These findings can be used to support targeted biological behavioral surveillance in high-risk 45 
geographic areas in order to reduce the risk of zoonotic disease emergence. 46 
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Highlights 51 
Scientific question 52 
What are the behavioral risks in human-animal interactions that could lead to the emergence of 53 
bat coronaviruses in human population. 54 
Evidence before this study 55 
Bat borne coronaviruses have caused several emerging infectious disease outbreaks of global 56 
significance, including SARS. Novel SARS-related coronaviruses have been discovered in bat 57 
populations in South China, some of which have the capacity to infect human cells. Human-58 
animal interactions are thought to be critical for the emergence of bat coronaviruses, however 59 
the specific interactions linked to animal-to-human spillover remain unknown. 60 
New Findings 61 
This study found serological evidence for bat-borne coronavirus transmission to people. Direct 62 
contact with bats was not identified as a risk factor. However, self-reported severe acute 63 
respiratory infection (SARI) and/or influenza-like illness (ILI) was linked to human interaction 64 
with other wildlife and livestock, suggesting that there may be other zoonotic exposures leading 65 
to clinical illness in these populations.  66 
Significance of the study 67 
Findings from this study suggested that an integrated biological and behavioral surveillance in 68 
healthy community settings can help identify potential zoonotic disease spillover events or target 69 
surveillance to at-risk populations. This approach represents a potential early-warning system 70 
that could be used under non-outbreak conditions to identify potential zoonotic emerging 71 
diseases prior to largescale outbreaks.   72 
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1. Introduction 73 
In the highly biodiverse southern region of China, interactions among humans, wildlife, and 74 
livestock are likely to be common, and are hypothesized to be a risk factor in the emergence of 75 
zoonotic infectious diseases [1-3]. Human-animal interactions may pose a particular public 76 
health threat in rural communities where frequent contact with animals occurs and where 77 
disease prevention measures are likely less well-developed [4]. Although human-animal 78 
interactions are thought to be associated with zoonotic disease emergence, few studies have 79 
addressed the nature of specific interactions that occur between animals (particularly wild 80 
animals) and humans that lead to pathogen spillover. 81 
 82 
Bats (order Chiroptera) are reservoirs of a large number of zoonotic viruses, including 83 
coronaviruses (CoVs) that have caused disease outbreaks in human and livestock populations 84 
[5-13]: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV), the causative agent of 85 
the SARS outbreak affecting 32 countries in 2002-3, infecting 8,096 people and causing 774 86 
deaths [14]; Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), which has caused 87 
823 deaths from 2,374 human cases in 27 countries by the end of February 2019, and is 88 
thought to have originally spilled over from bats into camels, in which is it now endemic [15-18]; 89 
and Severe acute diarrhea syndrome coronavirus (SADS-CoV) which emerged in the pig 90 
population of Southern China and caused the deaths of more than 20,000 piglets in 2017 and 91 
2018 [5].  92 
 93 
A large diversity of coronaviruses, including SARS-related Coronaviruses (SARSr-CoVs) have 94 
been discovered in bats, and phylogenetic and pathogenesis studies of these suggest a high 95 
capacity for transmission across species barriers [9, 11, 13, 18-22]. However, few studies have 96 
analyzed bat-to-human spillover events in non-outbreak conditions, likely due to the rarity of 97 
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these events, and difficulties in identifying at-risk populations or target geographies. Additionally, 98 
the symptoms of novel bat coronavirus infection in the human population may not be clinically 99 
recognized at the time of emergence due to lack of adequate surveillance, or confusion with 100 
other diseases. This represents a significant biosafety risk due to the large and increasing 101 
number of coronaviruses discovered in bats [23, 24] and the wide distribution of bat populations 102 
in rural regions such as Southern China [25].  103 
 104 
In this paper we report on a study designed to characterize the bat coronavirus spillover 105 
potential associated with presumed high-risk human behavior in rural communities of Southern 106 
China [26]. We collected data from community serological and behavioral surveillance to 107 
understand the driving factors of bat coronavirus spillover provide evidence for community-108 
based strategies to help prevent zoonotic disease emergence. 109 
 110 
2. Materials and Methods 111 
2.1 Study Location and Target Population 112 
We conducted a cross-sectional study in the provinces of Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong, 113 
China which are known for their high levels of animal biodiversity, active animal trade activity, 114 
and historic zoonotic disease emergence events [3, 5, 10, 14, 22, 24, 27]. Eight study sites were 115 
selected in areas where we have previously reported diverse coronaviruses in bat populations 116 
[24] close (within five kilometers) to human dwellings. The study targeted human populations 117 
that are highly exposed to bats and other wildlife, including people who visit or work around bat 118 
caves, work in local live animal markets, raise animals, or are involved in trading wild animals 119 
(e.g., wild animal harvest, trade, transportation, and preparation), as identified by previous 120 
exploratory ethnographic interviews. 121 
 122 
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2.2 Recruitment and Sampling 123 
Prior to recruitment and sampling, project staff who received human subject research training 124 
visited each participating site to introduce the project to the community with assistance from 125 
officials from provincial and city-level Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. To generate 126 
interest and develop recruitment strategies, project staff held meetings with village committees 127 
to discuss topics relevant to their daily contact with animals and any health issues in the 128 
community that were particularly concerning for them. With permissions from local authorities, 129 
community leaders conducted house visits and broadcast announcements a week before data 130 
collection took place to inform community residents about the study and its recruitment plan. All 131 
information was communicated in local dialects using simple language to convey the study 132 
purpose, eligibility and inclusion guidelines, potential risks and benefits of participation, and the 133 
time and locations at which the study would take place.  134 
 135 
We aimed to obtain a minimum sample size of 400 participants from each of the three provinces 136 
(Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong), for a total sample size of over 1,200 participants. A 137 
snowball sampling method was used because the population size at selected sites and the 138 
people who were highly exposed to wild animals were difficult to elucidate [28]. During each 139 
house visit, we requested information about potential eligible participants from the residents’ 140 
networks, and we then followed their referrals to recruit from the community. Only one person 141 
per household was recruited to participate in this study, and no participants were recruited from 142 
clinics or healthcare settings. We made every effort to include participants across a range of 143 
demographic indices including gender, age, and socioeconomic status, as well as to ensure that 144 
any contribution was voluntary and involved minimal risk to the participants. 145 
 146 
2.3 Data collection and management 147 
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Following the completion of the informed consent process, a standardized Mandarin 148 
questionnaire was administered by study staff in local dialects. The interview was conducted in 149 
a private environment where confidentiality was maintained, and interviewers and participants 150 
were paired by sex. Children aged 10 to 18 years were interviewed with the permission and in 151 
the presence of a parent or guardian.  152 
 153 
The questionnaire included five sections consisting of demographics, living circumstances and 154 
livelihood, travel, and types of contact with animals, as well as unusual illness symptoms in the 155 
past 12 months. The survey assessed symptoms including fever with cough and shortness of 156 
breath or difficulty breathing (severe acute respiratory infection [SARI] symptoms) and fever with 157 
muscle aches, cough, or sore throat (influenza-like illness [ILI] symptoms) (Appendices). SARI 158 
and ILI symptoms were included in the survey in anticipation of potentially low coronavirus sero-159 
positivity rates. These symptoms are commonly used as metrics in emerging infectious 160 
respiratory disease surveillance and are known to be associated with coronavirus infections 161 
(e.g., MERS-CoV, SARS-CoV) [29]. Therefore, SARI and ILI symptom histories can be 162 
analyzed in addition to serological testing to maximize our understanding of bat coronavirus 163 
spillover risk.  164 
 165 
After the questionnaire interview, participants were asked to provide a blood sample (2.5-5 mL 166 
stored in a serum-separating tube) and an oropharyngeal swab (stored in a cryotube with viral 167 
transport medium). Samples were collected by study staff from local clinics. All samples were 168 
stored in liquid nitrogen immediately after collection and transferred to an ultralow (-80°C) 169 
freezer within 48 hours. 170 
 171 
A unique alphanumeric identification code was assigned to each questionnaire and biological 172 
specimen collected from each participant. No personal identifying information was collected. 173 
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Only authorized study personnel who received human subject research training were allowed 174 
access to the questionnaire and biological data. 175 
 176 
2.4 Serological testing 177 
Serum samples collected from study participants were analyzed using newly developed IgG 178 
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISA) based on selected nucleocapsid proteins (NP) 179 
expressed and purified in E. coli for four specific coronaviruses: SARSr-CoV (DQ071615, Bat 180 
SARS coronavirus Rp3, NP), HKU10-CoV (sample 3740, NP), HKU9-CoV (MG762674, 181 
BatCoV_HKU9-2202, NP), and MERS-CoV (JX869059, Human betacoronavirus 2c EMC/2012, 182 
NP).  Micro-titer plates were coated with recombinant and purified NP (100ng/well); samples 183 
were tested at 1:20 dilution; and an anti-Human IgG-HRP conjugated monoclonal antibody 184 
(Kyab Biotech Co., Ltd, Wuhan, China) was used as the secondary antibody with different 185 
dilution ratios for different coronaviruses. 100 serum samples collected from healthy people in 186 
Wuhan were tested using this ELISA kit to set up the cutoff value, and positive test results were 187 
determined by the cut-off value in each run for each of the four coronaviruses, as the product of 188 
the mean of all serum samples’ optical density (OD) values plus three standard deviations, and 189 
confirmed by Western blot test [30]. 190 
 191 
2.5 Questionnaire data analysis 192 
Questionnaire data were entered into an Excel database with quality control for data cleaning 193 
and validation. The glmnet package in R version 3.6.0 was used to fit a least absolute shrinkage 194 
and selection operator (LASSO) regression to characterize associations between animal contact 195 
and SARI and/or ILI symptoms in the preceding 12 months [31, 32]. The bat coronavirus 196 
serology testing outcome was not analyzed in the LASSO due to low rates of sero-positivity.   197 
The LASSO regression is an adaptation of the generalized linear model (GLM) and was 198 
selected because it is effective at minimizing prediction error for datasets with many predictor 199 
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variables.  The model identifies subsets of predictors that are associated with the outcome of 200 
interest by applying a shrinkage operation to regression coefficients and shrinking some 201 
coefficients to exactly 0. The LASSO is often utilized for its variable selection capabilities for 202 
sparse datasets including surveys and questionnaires. Demographic variables (age, gender, 203 
province, and income) were included in the model as independent and interaction terms in order 204 
to account for potential confounding. Because the LASSO does not generate confidence 205 
intervals, we repeated the model using bootstrapping to instead calculate bootstrap support, i.e., 206 
the proportion of times a predictor variable is selected into the model [33-36] 207 
 208 
Chi-Square and fisher exact tests were also conducted to explore the associations between 209 
potential risk factors in local demographics, behaviors, and attitudes (independent variables) 210 
and bat CoV serological evidence (dependent variables), with effect size examined. However, 211 
due to the low positivity rate (9/1,497), the results were not robust and are not reported in this 212 
paper.  213 
3. Results  214 
From October 2015 to July 2017, a total of 1,596 residents from eight sites in Yunnan (n=761), 215 
Guangxi (n=412), and Guangdong (n=423) provinces were enrolled in this study. Of these, 216 
1,585 participants completed the questionnaires and 11 participants withdrew from the 217 
questionnaire interview due to scheduling reasons. After the interviews, 1,497 participants 218 
provided biological samples for lab analysis. 219 
 220 
3.1 Demographics 221 
More female (62%) than male (38%) community members participated in this study. Most 222 
participants were adults over 45 years old (69%) and had been living in the community for more 223 
than 5 years (97%) with their family members (95%). A majority relied on a comparatively low 224 
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family annual per capita income less than 10,000 RMB (86%), which is below the national mean 225 
of per capita disposable income of rural households from 2015 to 2017 (11,422 - 13,432 RMB) 226 
[37]. Most participants (98%) had not received a college education and were making a living on 227 
crop production (76%). 9% of participants frequently traveled outside the county as migrant 228 
laborers. Some participants were working in sectors where frequent human-animal contacts 229 
occur, such as the animal production business (1.7%), wild animal trade (0.5%), 230 
slaughterhouses or abattoirs (0.5%), protected nature reserve rangers (0.4%) or in wildlife 231 
restaurants (0.3%). It was common for participants to have multiple part-time jobs as income 232 
sources (Table 1)  233 
 China Human Coronavirus Spillover Study 
 11 
 234 
Variable  
Total 
N Valid % 
Gender  Female  968 61.5 
(n= 1,574) Male  605 38.4 
 Other  1 0.1 
Age  Under 18 years 71 4.5 
(n=1,582) 18 to 44 years 420 26.5 
 45 to 64 years 780 49.3 
 Age 65 or older 311 19.7 
Province  Guang Dong 420 26.5 
(n=1,585) Guang Xi 412 26.0 
 Yun Nan 753 47.5 
Residence time  < 1 month 4 0.3 
(n=1,568) 1 month – 1 year 12 0.8 
 1 year – 5 years 26 1.7 
 > 5 years 1,526 97.3 
Family annual  <1000 yuan 271 17.3 
PCI (n=1,565) 1001-10000 yuan 1067 68.2 
 >10000 yuan 227 14.5 
Livelihood  Extraction of minerals, gas, oil, timber (n=1,566) 5 0.3 
since last year Crop production (n=1,569) 1,196 76.2 
 Wildlife restaurant business (n=1,564) 5 0.3 
 Wild/exotic animal trade/market business (n=1,566) 8 0.5 
 Rancher/farmer animal production business (n=1,566) 27 1.7 
 Meat processing, slaughterhouse, abattoir (n=1,567) 8 0.5 
 Zoo/sanctuary animal health care (n=1,565) 1 0.1 
 Protected area worker (n=1,567) 7 0.4 
 Hunter/trapper/fisher (n=1,565) 3 0.2 
 Forager/gatherer/non-timber forest product collector (n=1,566) 4 0.3 
 Migrant laborer (n=1,567) 144 9.2 
 Nurse, doctor, healer, community health worker (n=1567) 7 0.4 
 Construction (n=1,564) 41 2.6 
 Other (n=1,568) 293 18.7 
Education  None 428 27.3 
(n=1,570) Primary School 632 40.3 
 Secondary school/Polytechnic school 479 30.5 
 College/university/professional 31 2.0 
Live with  No 73 4.7 
family 
(n=1,564) 
Yes 1491 95.3 
Table 1 Demographics of study participants. Total counts differ due to missing responses.  235 
3.2 Animal contact and exposure to bat coronaviruses  236 
Serological testing of serum samples from 1,497 local residents revealed that 9 individuals 237 
(0.6%) in four study sites were positive for bat coronaviruses, indicating exposure at some point 238 
in their life to bat origin SARSr-CoVs (n=7, Yunnan), HKU10 CoV (n=2, Guangxi), or other 239 
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coronaviruses that are phylogenetically closely related to these. All individuals who tested 240 
positive (male=6, female=3) were over 45 years old, and most (n=8) were making a living from 241 
crop production. None of those participants reported any symptoms in the 12 months preceding 242 
the interview.  243 
 244 
Due to the low rate of sero-positivity, we did not obtain robust results from the statistical 245 
comparisons of animal-contact behavior by coronavirus outcome. Figure 12 shows animal 246 
contact rates in the previous 12 months among the survey population (n= 1,585) and among 247 
seropositive individuals (n=9). Participants reported common contact with poultry and 248 
rodents/shrews, and most animal contact occurred in domestic settings through animal raising 249 
or food preparation activities.  250 
 251 
 252 
Figure 12. Animal contact by taxa and activities. Values and shading represent the survey 253 
population; red numbers in the upper-right corners of the cells indicate the number of 254 
seropositive individuals with the given contact.   255 
 256 
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3.3 Self-report SARI/ILI symptoms and animal contact  257 
Among the 1,585 participants who responded, 265 (17%) reported experiencing SARI (n = 73) 258 
and/or ILI (n = 227) symptoms in the last year.  The LASSO regression showed that eating raw 259 
or undercooked carnivores in the preceding 12 months was the most salient predictor of self-260 
reported SARI and/or ILI symptoms over the same time period (odds ratio [OR] = 1.6; bootstrap 261 
support = 0.67).  Additional salient predictors were slaughtering poultry as a resident of Guangxi 262 
province (OR = 1.4; support = 0.68), having an income below 10,000 RMB as a resident of 263 
Guangxi province (OR = 1.3; support = 0.84), domestic contact with bats (OR = 1.3; support = 264 
0.63) and domestic contact with rodents or shrews as a resident of Guangdong province (OR = 265 
1.2; support = 0.63) (Figure 23).   266 
 267 
Some demographic variables were associated with self-reported SARI and/or ILI symptoms as 268 
either independent or interactive terms.  For example, respondents aged 41 to 60 and residents 269 
of the YunNan province were less likely to report symptoms. Slaughtering poultry was positively 270 
associated with the outcome only in GuangXi residents, whereas the association was negative 271 
in GuangDong residents.  Family income also showed interactions, with family income less than 272 
10,000 RMB being positively associated with the outcome in respondents who raised poultry but 273 
negatively associated in respondents who cooked or handled poultry.  Gender was not found to 274 
be salient in either direction. 275 
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 276 
Figure 23. Most salient predictors of self-reported ILI and/or SARI symptoms in the last year (s = 277 
bootstrap support; n = count positive out of 1,585 respondents). Bootstrap support values  0.6 278 
are demonstrated here, meaning they were identified as associated with the outcome for 60% or 279 
more of the bootstrap iterations. Odds ratios > 1 (orange) are positively associated with the 280 
outcome, and odds ratios <1 (purple) are negatively associated with the outcome.  281 
 282 
3.4 Attitudes towards zoonotic diseases emergence 283 
When asked about animals and disease transmission, more than half of the study participants 284 
believed that animals could spread disease (n=871, 56%) and were worried about disease 285 
emergence from animals at wet markets (n=810, 52%). Of those worried about disease 286 
emergence, 46% (n=370) still purchased animals from wet markets in the past 12 months. 287 
Among all participants who purchased animals from wet markets in the past 12 months (n=502, 288 
32%), some (n=194, 39%) took protection measures or strategies such as washing hands, 289 
purchasing live animals less often (n=153, 30%), or purchasing meat at supermarkets instead of 290 
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live animal markets (n=148, 29%). Very few participants considered wearing a mask (n=7, 1%) 291 
or gloves (n=7, 1%) while visiting the markets. 292 
 293 
4. Discussion 294 
We used a novel human surveillance approach to integrate serological and behavioral data to 295 
characterize associations between human-animal contact and zoonotic disease spillover risk in 296 
Southern China. This study provides the first serological evidence of  bat-origin SARSr-CoVs 297 
and HKU10 CoV transmission to people and highlights potential spillover pathways through 298 
animal contact. Given the high diversity and recombination rate of bat coronaviruses, and close 299 
relationship of SARSr-CoVs to SARS-CoV, it is possible that exposure to these coronaviruses 300 
may lead to disease emergence in human populations. Continuous surveillance of both human 301 
and bat populations, as well as further pathogenesis studies of these viruses, are important to 302 
determine the extent of the disease risk. 303 
 304 
Contact with animals was prevalent among the survey population. Raising poultry and having 305 
rodents/shrews in the house were the most common types of contact. Correspondingly, contact 306 
with poultry and rodents/shrews, as well as with carnivores, was identified in the LASSO 307 
regression as being associated with self-reported ILI and/or SARI symptoms, with results 308 
varying by income and province. It’s important to note that the questionnaire used broad 309 
classification of the type of animals for these exposures due to the presumed variability in 310 
respondent’s capacity to identify species or genera of wildlife. It is likely that the most significant 311 
exposure we identified (to carnivores) reflects animals as diverse as civets, porcupines, ferret 312 
badgers and animals that respondents identified as non-rodent and non-shrew. This study also 313 
assessed health risks from human interaction activities for each study participant in the survey 314 
based on their travel history and the health history of people who they lived with, to minimize the 315 
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possibility of human-to-human transmission of other pathogens causing ILI and/or SARI 316 
symptoms. We did not find evidence supporting a direct relationship between bat contact and 317 
bat coronavirus sero-positivity in the human population. However, there is frequent contact with 318 
domestic animals in these communities and it is known that other bat-origin viruses have been 319 
transmitted to humans via livestock (e.g. henipavirses and filoviruses) [38-41]. It is possible that 320 
these findings reflect indirect exposure to bat CoVs via these pathway, or fomites and future 321 
surveillance may benefit from including a wide range of livestock and peri-domestic animals in 322 
viral and serological studies to identify potential spillover pathways [42-45]. 323 
 324 
While it is known that bias can occur in self-reported illness data, this approach has been widely 325 
used in previous disease surveillance and risk factor studies [46-49]. It may be particularly 326 
useful as an early warning system during non-outbreak conditions to assess broad categories of 327 
high-risk within communities for further longitudinal surveillance. This may be particularly 328 
important in rural communities, where people have high levels of contact with domestic and wild 329 
animals but may not seek diagnosis or treatment in a timely fashion, slowing early detection and 330 
response.  331 
 332 
While the majority of survey respondents believed that animals could spread disease and were 333 
worried about disease emergence from animals at wet markets, many did not take measures to 334 
protect themselves from exposure. Further work on what drives these local attitudes to risk may 335 
help in developing risk-mitigation behavior change programs. A number of affordable and 336 
readily adaptable measures could be targeted to these at-risk populations, including  use gloves 337 
and masks while killing or butchering animals, and handwashing.  338 
 339 
The low levels of sero-positivity found in the study could reflect a number of factors: 1) the rarity 340 
of spillover and bat-to-human transmission, as has been reported for other virus-host systems 341 
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[50-54]; 2) the use of a snowball technique for sample selection that could have biased the 342 
population sampled; 3) the limited diversity of CoVs that this study tested for; 4) the possibility 343 
that these infections cause high mortality rates and therefore the number of survivors and 344 
number of seropositive people is low, although this seems unlikely because the mortality rate 345 
from SARS was >10% during an outbreak that included hospital exposure and therefore likely 346 
high infectious doses [55, 56]; and 5) that antibodies to these viruses wane rapidly in humans. 347 
The latter hypothesis is supported by findings that antibodies to SARS decline rapidly (2-3 348 
years) after illness [57]. Expanding this approach to a larger cohort of subjects, using a 349 
longitudinal (repeated sampling) approach, and targeting selection to people who are in the 350 
higher risk categories we have identified may provide a larger number of sero-positives and 351 
more critical information on what drives spillover risk. However, despite the small sample sizes, 352 
this study suggests that there are a substantial number of people in rural Southern China who 353 
are exposed to bat-origin viruses, and that this exposure is likely within normal practices for 354 
rural communities, rather than specific high risk groups (e.g. wet market workers). Considering 355 
the proven potential of some SARSr-CoVs currently circulating in bats in southern China, to 356 
infect human cells, cause clinical signs in humanized mouse models, and lead to infections that 357 
cannot be treated with monoclonal therapies effective against SARS-CoV [58-60], this 358 
represents a clear and present danger to our biosafety and public health. Further studies to 359 
determine the relationship between SARSr-CoV and HKU10-CoV exposure and illness in 360 
people may help elucidate this risk and provide critical mitigation strategies. 361 
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Highlights 
 
Scientific question 
What are the behavioral risks in human-animal interactions that could lead to the emergence of 
bat coronaviruses in human population. 
 
Evidence before this study 
Bat borne coronaviruses have caused several emerging infectious disease outbreaks of global 
significance, including SARS. Novel SARS-related coronaviruses have been discovered in bat 
populations in South China, some of which have the capacity to infect human cells. Human-
animal interactions are thought to be critical for the emergence of bat coronaviruses, however 
the specific interactions linked to animal-to-human spillover remain unknown. 
 
New Findings 
This study found serological evidence for bat-borne coronavirus transmission to people. Direct 
contact with bats was not identified as a risk factor. However, self-reported severe acute 
respiratory infection (SARI) and/or influenza-like illness (ILI) was linked to human interaction 
with other wildlife and livestock, suggesting that there may be other zoonotic exposures leading 
to clinical illness in these populations.  
 
Significance of the study 
Findings from this study suggested that an integrated biological and behavioral surveillance in 
healthy community settings can help identify potential zoonotic disease spillover events or target 
surveillance to at-risk populations. This approach represents a potential early-warning system 
that could be used under non-outbreak conditions to identify potential zoonotic emerging 
diseases prior to largescale outbreaks.  
